Add to ORKGThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice procedures treats only of resolute procedures. Few real or reasonable procedures are resolute. We prove a generalization of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute case. It opens harder questions than it answers about the prediction of behavior and outcomes and the design of institutions
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strate...
This thesis gives a contribution to strategy-proof social choice theory, in which one investigates t...
When a number of like-minded voters vote strategically and have limited abilities to communicate the...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice procedures treats only ...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alter...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973/75) theorem roughly states that we have to accept dictatorship or ma...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. I...
Abstract: We extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in the following way. We prove that an onto, n...
Social choice theory, as the name suggests, deals with techniques for finding an alternative for a s...
A decision scheme (Gibbard (1977)) is a function mapping profiles of strict preferences over a set o...
A great deal o£ effort has gone into alleviating the regrettable consequences of the Gibbard-Sattert...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alt...
Recent papers by Barber~i and Peleg and by Zhou have established that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theo...
A voting rule is manipulable if it is sometimes possible for a voter to change the election’s outcom...
We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chose...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strate...
This thesis gives a contribution to strategy-proof social choice theory, in which one investigates t...
When a number of like-minded voters vote strategically and have limited abilities to communicate the...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice procedures treats only ...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alter...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973/75) theorem roughly states that we have to accept dictatorship or ma...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. I...
Abstract: We extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in the following way. We prove that an onto, n...
Social choice theory, as the name suggests, deals with techniques for finding an alternative for a s...
A decision scheme (Gibbard (1977)) is a function mapping profiles of strict preferences over a set o...
A great deal o£ effort has gone into alleviating the regrettable consequences of the Gibbard-Sattert...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alt...
Recent papers by Barber~i and Peleg and by Zhou have established that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theo...
A voting rule is manipulable if it is sometimes possible for a voter to change the election’s outcom...
We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chose...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strate...
This thesis gives a contribution to strategy-proof social choice theory, in which one investigates t...
When a number of like-minded voters vote strategically and have limited abilities to communicate the...