When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the same network, the resulting equilibrium may no longer be interpreted as a solution to the standard utility maximization problem. We prove the existence of equilibrium in general multiprotocol networks under mild assumptions. For almost all networks, the equilibria are locally unique, finite, and odd in number. They cannot all be locally stable unless there is a globally unique equilibrium. Finally, we show that if the price mapping functions, which map link prices to effective prices observed by the sources, are sufficiently similar, then global uniqueness is guaranteed
Abstract. We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We ...
We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We are intere...
Network pricing games provide a framework for modeling real-world settings with two types of strateg...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals s...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the s...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals (...
It has been proved theoretically that a network with heterogeneous congestion control algorithms tha...
We consider an economic model for a communication network with utility-maximizing elastic users who ...
We study control of congestion in general topology communication networks within a fairly general ma...
In this paper, we study the problem of designing globally stable, scalable congestion control algori...
We present a simplied model of a network of TCP-like sources that compete for a shared bandwidth. We...
We derive a model of congestion control where the trade-off between utility and path diversity can b...
Abstract. We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We ...
We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We are intere...
Network pricing games provide a framework for modeling real-world settings with two types of strateg...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals s...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the s...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals (...
It has been proved theoretically that a network with heterogeneous congestion control algorithms tha...
We consider an economic model for a communication network with utility-maximizing elastic users who ...
We study control of congestion in general topology communication networks within a fairly general ma...
In this paper, we study the problem of designing globally stable, scalable congestion control algori...
We present a simplied model of a network of TCP-like sources that compete for a shared bandwidth. We...
We derive a model of congestion control where the trade-off between utility and path diversity can b...
Abstract. We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We ...
We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We are intere...
Network pricing games provide a framework for modeling real-world settings with two types of strateg...