Add to ORKGSelten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 23. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 1974
This paper exploits an analogy between the “trembles” that underlie the functioning of simulated ann...
with Cristian Litan. One of the goals of the equilibrium refinement literature is to examine what is...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution c...
Selten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Workin...
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness con...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of...
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian ...
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian ...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
This paper exploits an analogy between the “trembles” that underlie the functioning of simulated ann...
This paper exploits an analogy between the “trembles” that underlie the functioning of simulated ann...
with Cristian Litan. One of the goals of the equilibrium refinement literature is to examine what is...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution c...
Selten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Workin...
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness con...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of...
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian ...
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian ...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
This paper exploits an analogy between the “trembles” that underlie the functioning of simulated ann...
This paper exploits an analogy between the “trembles” that underlie the functioning of simulated ann...
with Cristian Litan. One of the goals of the equilibrium refinement literature is to examine what is...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution c...