Add to ORKGOptimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than the regulator. When marginal production costs increase with output, the regulator can induce the firm to use its private information entirely in the social interest. When marginal costs decline with output, however, the regulator is unable to derive any benefit from the firm's superior knowledge, and a single price is established that is invariant to demand
I study the regulation of a \u85rm producing a good with two attributes, e.g. quantity and quality. ...
In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermedi...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
The authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand ...
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous ...
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous ...
I study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about...
We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about c...
This article examines the optimal strategy for a regulator who seeks to maximize expected consumers'...
This paper studies the optimal behavior of a regulator facing tho markets monopolized by two firms: ...
This paper studies whether a monopolist with private marginal cost information has incentives to mak...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
Summary: We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator ha...
This article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better informatio...
This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on the com...
I study the regulation of a \u85rm producing a good with two attributes, e.g. quantity and quality. ...
In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermedi...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
The authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand ...
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous ...
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous ...
I study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about...
We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about c...
This article examines the optimal strategy for a regulator who seeks to maximize expected consumers'...
This paper studies the optimal behavior of a regulator facing tho markets monopolized by two firms: ...
This paper studies whether a monopolist with private marginal cost information has incentives to mak...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
Summary: We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator ha...
This article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better informatio...
This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on the com...
I study the regulation of a \u85rm producing a good with two attributes, e.g. quantity and quality. ...
In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermedi...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...