We argue that product markets and financial markets have important linkages. Assuming on oligopoly in which financial and output decisions follow in sequence, we show that limited liability may commit a leveraged firm to a more aggressive output stance. Because firms will have incentives to use financial structure to influence the output market, this demonstrates a new determinant of the debt-equity ratio
This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are protected by...
We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks ...
This paper analyzes the interaction of financing and output market decisions in a duopoly in which o...
This paper examines the relationship between financial decisions and output decisions in oligopolist...
Brander and Lewis argue in a seminal paper (AER, 1986) that a firm's debt-equity ratio should have i...
This paper has implications for policy makers within EU supporting increased competition by enforcin...
In a seminal paper Brander and Lewis (Am Econ Rev 76:956–970, 1986) show that oligopolistic firms wi...
This paper examines the recent proposal to eliminate the limited liability of company owners, in the...
The study illustrates that a financial restriction may serve as a disciplining device on the interna...
It is shown that managers who act in the interests of corporate insiders behave more (less) aggressi...
The study illustrates that a financial restriction may serve as a disciplining device on the interna...
This thesis consists of three essays in the theory of Industrial Organization. More specifically, th...
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product...
The relationship between capital structure and product market competition is examined using a theore...
This paper develops a theory of the firm, and equilibrium credit rationing mech-anisms in oligopoly ...
This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are protected by...
We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks ...
This paper analyzes the interaction of financing and output market decisions in a duopoly in which o...
This paper examines the relationship between financial decisions and output decisions in oligopolist...
Brander and Lewis argue in a seminal paper (AER, 1986) that a firm's debt-equity ratio should have i...
This paper has implications for policy makers within EU supporting increased competition by enforcin...
In a seminal paper Brander and Lewis (Am Econ Rev 76:956–970, 1986) show that oligopolistic firms wi...
This paper examines the recent proposal to eliminate the limited liability of company owners, in the...
The study illustrates that a financial restriction may serve as a disciplining device on the interna...
It is shown that managers who act in the interests of corporate insiders behave more (less) aggressi...
The study illustrates that a financial restriction may serve as a disciplining device on the interna...
This thesis consists of three essays in the theory of Industrial Organization. More specifically, th...
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product...
The relationship between capital structure and product market competition is examined using a theore...
This paper develops a theory of the firm, and equilibrium credit rationing mech-anisms in oligopoly ...
This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are protected by...
We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks ...
This paper analyzes the interaction of financing and output market decisions in a duopoly in which o...