We will investigate the amount of residual demand in a market consisting of only one consumer and two producers. Since there is only one consumer, we cannot really speak about a rationing rule, but we can ask ourselves whether a known rationing rule reflects the consumer’s utility maximizing behavior. We will show that, if the consumer has a Cobb-Douglas utility function, then the amount purchased by the consumer from the high-price firm lies between the values determined according to the efficient rationing rule and the random rationing rule. We will show further, that if the consumer has a quasilinear utility function, then in the economically interesting case his residual demand function will be equal to the residual demand function und...
For a symmetric two-stage game, where firms first choose capacities, then compete in prices, Kreps a...
Tobin and Houthakker\u27s work on consumer behavior under quantity rationing has been extended by ma...
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown ...
We will investigate the amount of residual demand in a market consisting of only one consumer and tw...
We will investigate the amount of residual demand in a market consisting of only one consumer and tw...
In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which d...
In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which d...
The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter ...
This note outlines a simple routine for evaluation of consumer demand under disequilibrium (shortage...
In this paper we seek to provide a resolution of the Edgeworth paradox for the case where firms are ...
There are a couple of well-known unsatisfactory properties in the notion of effective demand defined...
We examine a model of price competition where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quan...
Tobin and Houthakker\u27s work on consumer behavior under quantity rationing has been extended by ma...
The paper treats the consumer behavior after the nature of it’s preferences. There are analyze...
Tobin and Houthakker\u27s work on consumer behavior under quantity rationing has been extended by ma...
For a symmetric two-stage game, where firms first choose capacities, then compete in prices, Kreps a...
Tobin and Houthakker\u27s work on consumer behavior under quantity rationing has been extended by ma...
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown ...
We will investigate the amount of residual demand in a market consisting of only one consumer and tw...
We will investigate the amount of residual demand in a market consisting of only one consumer and tw...
In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which d...
In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which d...
The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter ...
This note outlines a simple routine for evaluation of consumer demand under disequilibrium (shortage...
In this paper we seek to provide a resolution of the Edgeworth paradox for the case where firms are ...
There are a couple of well-known unsatisfactory properties in the notion of effective demand defined...
We examine a model of price competition where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quan...
Tobin and Houthakker\u27s work on consumer behavior under quantity rationing has been extended by ma...
The paper treats the consumer behavior after the nature of it’s preferences. There are analyze...
Tobin and Houthakker\u27s work on consumer behavior under quantity rationing has been extended by ma...
For a symmetric two-stage game, where firms first choose capacities, then compete in prices, Kreps a...
Tobin and Houthakker\u27s work on consumer behavior under quantity rationing has been extended by ma...
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown ...