The Analysis of the Taiwan Rice Contract Farming

[[abstract]]台灣農業屬於小農型態，其特徵為經營規模小且生產成本高。因此無力對抗國外大規模的機械化生產，又農業勞動力老化導致無法迅速應對市場變動。面對上述困難，與農企業簽訂農業契約可保障農民福利，克服農民在銷售過程中資訊不對稱與生產規模的劣勢。本研究以契約農業為研究對象，自理論模型輔以模擬實證，證明農民簽訂契約能有效降低市場價格風險，穩定農民收入。模擬結果顯示：現貨市場價格與現貨市場價格波動程度，隨著農民避險率增加，農企業的需求可在契約市場逐漸獲得滿足，使得現貨市場萎縮，導致現貨市場價格下降。再者，當現貨市場逐漸萎縮，現貨市場的生產衝擊造成現貨市場價格波動擴大。敏感度分析亦證明：當農民風險趨避程度增加，即農民偏好契作交易時，農民避險率與現貨市場價格負向關係加深，且現貨市場價格波動程度也更形擴大。然而，政府長期推動農業契作，但成效不彰。本研究建議：政府農業契約政策應回歸契約本質，尊重市場機制，彈性調整每年或每期的收購價格，提供穩定收入的誘因，使參與農業契約的農民，願意參與契作。 The main features of The Taiwan agriculture are small-scale, high production cost and the aging labor force. Facing the competition from the world, our farmers are relative weak and difficult to react effectively. Contract farming can be a solution to improve farmers’ welfare by reducing the uncertainty of spot markets. In this research, it is of interest to consider how spot price level and volatility change with the hedge ratio, or say contract percentage.At first, the theoretical model analyzed the optimizing behavior of farmers who produce products in the presence of forward contracting, and derived a set of individual supply and demand functions under price uncertainty and risk aversion. Stochastic simulation is further used to generate spot price series concerning price levels and volatility. Sensitivity of results to specification are explored as well.In conclusion, forward contracting is used as an insurance/risk-smoothing instrument to facilitate market transactions that deal with quantity uncertainty and risk-averse agents. The existence of forward contracting enhances transaction performance by reduction of spot transaction risks. Given contracting offers an important means of private market coordination, it is essential that its implications be fully understood as a basis for determination of need for and appropriate