The Equivalence between Internally Vertical Control and Competition Strategies

[[abstract]]企業為了獲取最大的利潤，往往會訂定各種市場競爭策略，但企業在制定市場競爭策略時，常會受到該國的「反拖拉斯」等相關法律之約束，因此某些可以增進獲利的市場競爭策略無法採行，而企業的內部管理卻不受該項法律之限制。本文試圖建立一個經濟學模型，說明企業可藉由市場競爭策略以取得競爭優勢，若市場競爭策略因法律之限制而無法採行，只要企業採取適當的內部管理模式，也可達到與市場競爭策略相同的效果。亦即，企業的市場競爭策略與其內部管理具有相同的效果。文中我們也分析，國際間的反拖拉斯政策之差異對國際貿易結果的影響，並對我國政府執行公平交易法提出建言。[[abstract]]To maximize its profit, a firm can use market competition strategies or internal administration. However, some of its beneficial market competition strategies contradict the Anti-trust law, so it is impossible to enforce these strategies. In this paper, by a game theory model, we explore the equivalence between a firm's internally vertical control and its competition strategies. First, we examine how a firm can use the vertical restraints to obtain the market competition leadership. Then, we show that a firm's internally vertical control has the same effects as these competition strategies. Furthermore, we also examine how Antitrust Law affects the international trade outcomes, and give some suggestions for the Fair Trade Commission how to enforce the Fair Trade Law to regulate firms' vertical restraints