Add to ORKGIn the absence of a perfect risk adjustment scheme, reimbursing health insurers' costs can reduce risk selection in community-rated health insurance markets. In this paper, we develop a model in which insurers determine the cost efficiency of health care and have incentives for risk selection. We derive the optimal cost reimbursement function which balances the incentives for cost efficiency and risk selection. For health cost data from a Swiss health insurer, we find that an optimal cost reimbursement scheme should reimburse costs only up to a limit
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyhol...
This paper studies general health insurance markets. It proposes an ex post risk adjustment scheme t...
Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerlan...
In the absence of a perfect risk adjustment scheme, reimbursing health insurers' costs can reduce ri...
This thesis analyzes risk-adjustment schemes, a regulatory means to reduce incentives for risk selec...
In most markets, competition induces efficiency by ensuring that goods are priced according to their...
Risk equalization mechanisms mitigate insurers’ incentives to practice risk selection. On the other ...
Risk equalization mechanisms mitigate insurers’ incentives to practice risk selection. On the other ...
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk ...
The tradeoff between an insurer's or medical provider's incentives to select good risks and to produ...
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk ...
We analyze the role of community rating in the optimal design of a risk adjustment scheme in competi...
The object of the paper is to review theoretical and empirical contributions to the optimal manageme...
In diesem Beitrag stellen wir eine Methode zur Bestimmung des optimalen Risikopools in der gesetzlic...
We analyze optimal risk adjustment in competitive health-insurance markets when insurers have better...
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyhol...
This paper studies general health insurance markets. It proposes an ex post risk adjustment scheme t...
Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerlan...
In the absence of a perfect risk adjustment scheme, reimbursing health insurers' costs can reduce ri...
This thesis analyzes risk-adjustment schemes, a regulatory means to reduce incentives for risk selec...
In most markets, competition induces efficiency by ensuring that goods are priced according to their...
Risk equalization mechanisms mitigate insurers’ incentives to practice risk selection. On the other ...
Risk equalization mechanisms mitigate insurers’ incentives to practice risk selection. On the other ...
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk ...
The tradeoff between an insurer's or medical provider's incentives to select good risks and to produ...
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk ...
We analyze the role of community rating in the optimal design of a risk adjustment scheme in competi...
The object of the paper is to review theoretical and empirical contributions to the optimal manageme...
In diesem Beitrag stellen wir eine Methode zur Bestimmung des optimalen Risikopools in der gesetzlic...
We analyze optimal risk adjustment in competitive health-insurance markets when insurers have better...
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyhol...
This paper studies general health insurance markets. It proposes an ex post risk adjustment scheme t...
Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerlan...