Add to ORKGThis paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of...
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of...
International audienceWe consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in wh...
This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is t...
This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is t...
I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called “Experimental Equilibrium”, in whi...
Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where f...
preliminary, comments welcome A proper understanding of the determinants of co-operation is crucial ...
Much of the recent interest in the economic applications of game theory has been drawn to time-incon...
A local interaction game is a game where agents play an identical stage game against their neighbors...
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of...
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of...
International audienceWe consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in wh...
This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is t...
This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is t...
I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called “Experimental Equilibrium”, in whi...
Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where f...
preliminary, comments welcome A proper understanding of the determinants of co-operation is crucial ...
Much of the recent interest in the economic applications of game theory has been drawn to time-incon...
A local interaction game is a game where agents play an identical stage game against their neighbors...
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of...
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of...
International audienceWe consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in wh...