This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the negotiated level of IPRs and its post-treaty enforcement. The optimal level of IPR protection relates positively to absorptive capacity. This provides a rationale for the longer time-frame provided to least developed countries in Article 66 of TRIPS to implement its provisions. In addition, monitoring is only effective in preventing contract violation up to a critical level of absorptive capacity. We relate this to the US Trade Representative “Special...
Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a mode...
We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete i...
This paper studies the incentives that developing countries have to enforce intellectual properties ...
This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a...
This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a...
We examine how trade liberalization affects South’s incentive to protect intellectual property right...
Using bilateral trade data of countries from 2000 to 2007, this paper contributes to the empirical l...
Now that most countries have harmonized intellectual property right (IPR) legislation as a consequen...
2011-11-22This dissertation studies the reasons and mechanisms of domestic compliance and implementa...
This paper analyzes welfare implications of protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) in the fra...
In this paper, we analyze whether the recent global process of strengthening and harmonization of in...
Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a mode...
We study firms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North-South cont...
We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete i...
In this paper, we analyze whether the recent global process of strengthening and harmonization of in...
Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a mode...
We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete i...
This paper studies the incentives that developing countries have to enforce intellectual properties ...
This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a...
This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a...
We examine how trade liberalization affects South’s incentive to protect intellectual property right...
Using bilateral trade data of countries from 2000 to 2007, this paper contributes to the empirical l...
Now that most countries have harmonized intellectual property right (IPR) legislation as a consequen...
2011-11-22This dissertation studies the reasons and mechanisms of domestic compliance and implementa...
This paper analyzes welfare implications of protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) in the fra...
In this paper, we analyze whether the recent global process of strengthening and harmonization of in...
Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a mode...
We study firms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North-South cont...
We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete i...
In this paper, we analyze whether the recent global process of strengthening and harmonization of in...
Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a mode...
We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete i...
This paper studies the incentives that developing countries have to enforce intellectual properties ...