Add to ORKGMany have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also provide evidence against it. Similarly, many have claimed that your credence should never be on the edge of the range of credences that you think might be rational. Surprisingly, both of these principles imply that you cannot rationally be modest: you cannot be uncertain what the rational opinions are
Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, ...
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since yo...
In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be ...
Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also p...
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in th...
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since yo...
Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-...
According to the so-called ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis, while deliberating about wha...
ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational be...
According to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her credence in...
Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, ...
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since yo...
In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be ...
Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also p...
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in th...
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since yo...
Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-...
According to the so-called ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis, while deliberating about wha...
ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational be...
According to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her credence in...
Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, ...
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since yo...
In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be ...