syria-un-20140212 30

A/HRC/25/65 30 Annex II [English only] Political and humanitarian context Political context 1. Since March 2011, the conflict devolved from a domestic protest movement into a non-international armed conflict. As protests spread from Dara’a governorate to other parts of the country, Government forces resorted to excessive use of force to quell the unrest. In parallel, the Government passed legal and political reforms that failed to diffuse the crisis. As early as July 2011, small groups of army defectors joined by armed civilians engaged with Government forces in restive areas.. The Government framed its military response to the unrest in the context of fighting terrorism, while the opposition insisted on its demands for democracy and dignity. 2. In response to the deepening crisis, various opposition currents formed the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in November 2012. The Coalition represents a wide array of civilian and political forces including local councils, independent nationalist figures and the Syrian National Council (SNC). The latter forms the largest bloc in the Coalition accounting for 22 of its 66 seats. The Coalition also encompasses the Supreme Military Council (SMC) which is intended to unify armed groups, curb the influence of radical groups and bridge the gap with armed actors. On 25 September 2013, thirteen of the most influential armed groups renounced their affiliation with the SMC and formed the Islamic Front (IF), weakening the credibility of the Coalition. The SNC’s latest withdrawal from the Coalition, further undermined the latter’s position on the eve of the Geneva 2 talks. Despite broadening its representation base to include the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and members of the internal opposition, some armed and political forces consider that the Coalition lacks effective representation on the ground and it is influenced by external factors. However, the Coalition remains the main political entity, representing the opposition, in the conduct of foreign affairs. 3. Since August 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) reinforced its control of captured areas in northern Syria, particularly in Al-Raqqah, Aleppo and Idlib countryside as foreign fighters continue to join its ranks. ISIS, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, runs areas under its control through local administrations governed by the strict application of Sharia Law. Those areas are meant to form the foundation of a future Islamic state extending beyond Syria’s borders. Over past months, restrictions on civil liberties tightened while human rights violations significantly increased in these areas under the group’s control. With the surge of the influence of radical groups, including ISIS, the foreign policy of regional and international actors, is increasingly geared towards addressing the rising threat of extremism. 4. In the Syrian Kurdish regions, this dynamic led to an open conflict between the Salafi Jihadi and Kurdish groups. A PYD-led coalition established an interim Kurdish administration with municipal councils in three provinces, Jazirah, Ayn Al-Arab and Afrin in January 2014. Alongside the KNC’s inclusion in the Coalition, both have engaged in policy discussions within the framework of the Supreme Kurdish Council under the auspices of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq