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A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 10 while many protests had been conducted in full legality, others had been held without notification and disrupted public order. 38. On 2 November, the Council of the League of Arab States announced that the Syrian Arab Republic had agreed on a workplan to end violence and protect citizens. The Government also pledged to release all those detained in relation to the recent events, to remove armed elements from cities and inhabited areas, and to give the specialized organizations of the League and Arab and international media access to the country. The Council mandated a ministerial committee of the League to oversee and report on the implementation of the workplan. According to the Government, 553 detainees were released pursuant to the agreement. Continued violence and the non-implementation of the agreement prompted the League, on 12 November, to adopt a resolution suspending Syrian activities within the organization. The resolution also imposed economic and political sanctions on the country, and reiterated the previous demand that the Syrian Arab Republic withdraw its armed forces from cities and residential areas. The League urged its Member States to recall their ambassadors from Damascus. The measures came into force on 16 November. On 15 November, 1,180 prisoners were also released. 39. In November, military and security forces carried out operations in Homs, Dar’a, Hama, Dayr Az Zawr and Rif Damascus, targeting public assemblies and funeral processions. In Homs, the operations were conducted in the residential areas of Alqaseer, Bab Amr, Bab Al Sibaa, Bab Hood and Karm Al Zaitoon. According to eyewitnesses, tanks deployed in and around the city frequently fired at residential buildings. It is estimated that, in a three-week period until 13 November, 260 civilians were killed. According to information received, a small number of defectors claiming to be part of the Free Syrian Army engaged in operations against State forces, killing and injuring members of military and security forces. 40. On 20 November, in an interview published by The Sunday Times, President Al Assad explained that his Government did not have a policy to treat the public harshly; its aim was to fight militants to restore stability and protect civilians. He added that any “mistakes” committed by officials would be addressed by the independent special legal commission. B. Excessive use of force and extrajudicial executions 41. According to individual testimonies, including those of defectors who have acknowledged their role in policing and quelling the protests, State forces shot indiscriminately at unarmed protestors. Most were shot in the upper body, including in the head. Defectors from military and security forces told the commission that they had received orders to shoot at unarmed protesters without warning. In some instances, however, commanders of operations ordered protesters to disperse and issued warnings prior to opening fire. In some cases, non-lethal means were used prior to or at the same time as live ammunition. 42. The commission received several testimonies indicating that military and security forces and Shabbiha militias had planned and conducted joint operations with “shoot to kill” orders to crush demonstrations. Such operations were conducted in the centre of Al Ladhiqiyah around Sheikh Daher Square in early April, and also in the Ramel suburb of Al Ladhiqiyah on 13 and 14 August. During the latter incident, at least 20 people, including children, were reportedly killed. In other incidents, officers ordered their personnel to attack protesters without warning, hitting them with batons. 43. A defector described to the commission the rationale for deployment and the orders that were given to his army battalion on 1 May