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A/HRC/23/58 6 opponents, translating into arms consignments and political backing to both sides by their respective allies: witness the decision taken by the European Union to allow a ban on weapons deliveries to the Syrian opposition to lapse on 1 June, and the announcement of a shipment by the Russian Federation of S-300 missile batteries to the Government. Other international initiatives include meetings held by the pro-opposition Friends of Syria, and an international conference held in Tehran on 29 May. 17. On 7 May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergei Lavrov, and Secretary of State of the United States of America, John Kerry, launched a joint political initiative aimed at convening an international conference to follow-up on the meeting held in Geneva on 30 June 2012, after which a joint communiqué was issued.3 Although no date has been set, an inclusive conference could break the diplomatic stalemate by delivering a comprehensive political process to end the violence. B. Military context 18. Hostilities in the Syrian Arab Republic have steadily expanded in recent months to new regions, increasingly along a sectarian divide. Brutal tactics adopted during military operations, particularly by government forces, have frequently led to massacres and destruction on an unprecedented scale. The conflict has become even more complex as violence has spilled over into neighbouring countries, threatening regional peace and stability. 1. Government forces and affiliated militia 19. Government forces continued to prioritize the control of major urban centres and main lines of communication connecting strategic regions. With the exception of Ar Raqqah, the Government has held all major cities despite facing serious challenges in Aleppo, Dara’a and Dayr az Zawr. Recently, it launched ground operations in the Damascus countryside and in Dara’a and Homs governorates to expel armed groups from strategic positions and to maintain the country’s main supply routes. In other operations, government forces sought to cut supply lines connecting armed groups with their support networks in neighbouring countries. 20. Meanwhile, the army, supported by “popular committees”,4 has increasingly relied upon its long-standing strategy of denying food and medical supplies to restive localities as a tactic to prevent the expansion of armed groups and to force the displacement of the population. 21. In regions held by armed groups in the northern and eastern governorates, government forces resumed their brutal and often indiscriminate campaign of shelling, using a wide variety of weaponry. Besides the continuous use of aerial bombardments, they fired strategic missiles, cluster and thermobaric bombs. This appears to be part of a broader strategy aimed at eroding civilian support for anti-government armed groups and at damaging infrastructure. The majority of these attacks targeted towns and neighbourhoods controlled or infiltrated by armed groups rather than the military bases of those groups. 22. Defections and casualties affected the strength and cohesion of government forces. To generate combat power, the Government increasingly relied on militia recently transformed into the National Defence Army, a paramilitary force. Drawn mainly from pro- 3 See A/66/865-S/2012/522. 4 See A/HRC/22/59, para. 22