syria-un-20161024 4

S/2016/888 4/15 16-18485 (e) Al-Tamanah, Idlib governorate, 25 and 26 May 2014; (f) Qmenas, Idlib governorate, 16 March 2015; (g) Sarmin, Idlib governorate, 16 March 2015; (h) Binnish, Idlib governorate, 24 March 2015; (i) Marea, Aleppo governorate, 21 August 2015. 5. Following the identification of those nine cases, the Mechanism began its second phase (case investigation), which consisted of in-depth analysis of the cases and continued until sufficient relevant information had been gathered, analysed, assessed and corroborated to allow it to present its findings to the Security Council. 6. The Mechanism was not mandated to act and function as a judicial or quasi-judicial body. Moreover, it has no authority or jurisdiction, whether directly or indirectly, to make a formal or binding judicial determination of criminal liability. The Mechanism functioned as a non-judicial investigative body within its mandate, identifying “to the greatest extent feasible” individuals and other actors involved in the use of chemicals as weapons and the roles that they played. It accordingly developed its own standards, as indicated in annex I to its third report. 7. The Leadership Panel decided that, in reporting its findings to the Security Council, a sufficient degree of supporting evidence was required — that is, there is evidence of a credible and reliable nature to determine that a party was involved in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (see also S/2016/142, enclosure, sect. III, and S/2016/738/Rev.1, annex I). 8. The Leadership Panel, to implement a systematic approach in making the assessments, decided on key elements that the investigation would seek to establish for each case: (a) date and time; (b) weather conditions; (c) impact location; (d) munition (e.g., remnants); (e) delivery method (e.g., means and direction); (f) damage and effects (e.g., on buildings, the environment, flora and fauna); and (g) medical effects. The Mechanism aimed to corroborate all information and, as necessary, information was subjected to a separate analytical process, including through forensic analysis. In those cases in which key elements could be established consistently, the Panel reached a conclusion on the actors involved. 9. During the investigation, the Mechanism reviewed and analysed the fact-finding mission information, in addition to the information and material that it had collected. This included more than 8,500 pages of documents, transcripts of more than 200 interviews, over 950 pieces of photographic material, more than 450 videos obtained from open sources and provided by witnesses, approximately 330 pages of forensic analysis and 3,500 multimedia files. The most pertinent material was, after initial analysis by the Mechanism, further analysed by four internationally recognized forensic and defence institutes. 10. On this basis and as reflected in its third report, the Leadership Panel determined that there was sufficient information on three cases investigated to reach a conclusion as to the actors involved. The cases were Talmenes (21 April 2014), Sarmin (16 March 2015) and Marea (21 August 2015). Furthermore, the information and evidence collected in relation to three other cases investigated were deemed not to reach the level of sufficiency required for the Panel to reach a conclusion as t