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S/2017/131 4/6 17-02111 General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2015/669 and S/2015/696). The structure, terms of reference and procedures, including with regard to the Mechanism’s methods of work, information management, modalities for access, evidence and reporting, therefore remain unchanged. 6. Furthermore, in paragraphs 4 and 9 of resolution 2319 (2016), the Mechanism was encouraged to consult appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. This was in order to exchange information on non-State actor perpetration, organization, sponsorship or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons for those incidents falling within the Mechanism’s mandate and, as appropriate, to brief those bodies on relevant results of the Mechanism’s work. 7. The Mechanism was also invited, in paragraph 5 of resolution 2319 (2016), to engage with relevant regional States in pursuit of its mandate, including in order to identify to the greatest extent feasible any individuals, entities or groups associated with ISIL or the Nusrah Front (now calling itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham), on the incidents falling within the Mechanism’s mandate. Furthermore, regional States were encouraged to provide to the Mechanism, as appropriate, information on non-State actors’ access to chemical weapons and their components or efforts by non-State actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use chemical weapons and their means of delivery that occurred under their jurisdiction. 8. In addition, the Mechanism was invited, in paragraph 6 of resolution 2319 (2016), to offer its assistance to OPCW in situations where a State party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction requested assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. III. Activities 9. In its fourth report, the Mechanism reported that it had closed its investigations office in The Hague, Netherlands, and its liaison office in Damascus on 23 September 2016 because the technical roll-over authorized by the Security Council through the exchange of letters (S/2016/806 and S/2016/807) was solely for the completion and submission of its fourth report. After the submission of that report, a second technical roll-over was authorized to allow for consultations on the possible renewal of the mandate. 10. During the period of this second technical roll-over, the New York office remained minimally staffed. After the adoption of resolution 2319 (2016), efforts were focused on budgetary issues and on refitting the investigative office in The Hague, including providing equipment necessary for secure information management and staffing. 11. In this regard, the Mechanism had previously reported that alternative information collection efforts and investigative skills would be required t