Mental disorder as both natural and normative : developing the normative dimension of the 3e conceptual framework for psychopathology

Current arguments concerning the role of normativity within the concept of mental disorder are explored, and some requirements of a successful normative construal sketched out. We then shift to a discussion of "natural" normativity to lay the groundwork for our own understanding of what counts as a mental disorder. The view we present is grounded in an enactive, embodied, and embedded view of the mind (3e cognition). The position argued for is one where the labeling of a particular set of behaviors as disordered or dysfunctional is justified by the significant violation of norms, but where the norms in question are not socially imposed, rather they are the functional norms of the individual being diagnosed. The strengths and weaknesses of our position are discussed, and an addendum is proposed in response to a foreseeable counterargument. This construal provides a conceptual framework for thinking critically about normative issues in diagnosis, appreciates how central normativity is to the concept of mental disorder, and, finally (in being tied to the functionality of the individual), places the institutions of psychiatry and clinical psychology on good ethical ground and allows for consideration of cultural and individual variation during the diagnostic process