The regulator of a natural monopoly that sets a two-part tariff and whose marginal cost is stochastic will generally want the price to vary less than marginal cost when the lump-sum charge in the tariff is fixed. A trade-off exists between efficient pricing and an optimal allocation of risk. Pricing at marginal cost is only optimal when the consumer's marginal utility is independent of the price. When marginal utility increases with the price the mark-up falls monotonically as marginal cost rises. The lump-sum element of the tariff should exceed the fixed cost when demand is inelastic and equals the fixed cost only with unit elasticity. The model may also be applied to optimal commodity taxation
In this thesis an attempt is made to describe the main features and some of the attendant problems o...
We study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention for a risky v...
In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters....
The regulator of a natural monopoly that sets a two-part tariff and whose marginal cost is stochasti...
The model shows how a regulated monopolist's price should change as random cost and demand parameter...
The paper assesses the welfare effects of different ways of allocating input price risk between a re...
The paper assesses the welfare effects of different ways of allocating input price risk between a re...
Abstract: The paper analyzes a monopolistic insurer’s pricing strategies when poten-tial customers d...
The paper shows how commodity taxes can provide insurance to consumers when the producer price is vo...
The paper shows how commodity taxes can provide insurance to consumers when the producer price is vo...
Authorities often lack information for efficient regulation of the commons. This paper derives a cri...
In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermedi...
Marginal cost pricing, so often praised in theoretical as well as empirical studies, is correct only...
It is usually argued that the monopolistic pricing distortion arises because "a monopoly can raise i...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
In this thesis an attempt is made to describe the main features and some of the attendant problems o...
We study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention for a risky v...
In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters....
The regulator of a natural monopoly that sets a two-part tariff and whose marginal cost is stochasti...
The model shows how a regulated monopolist's price should change as random cost and demand parameter...
The paper assesses the welfare effects of different ways of allocating input price risk between a re...
The paper assesses the welfare effects of different ways of allocating input price risk between a re...
Abstract: The paper analyzes a monopolistic insurer’s pricing strategies when poten-tial customers d...
The paper shows how commodity taxes can provide insurance to consumers when the producer price is vo...
The paper shows how commodity taxes can provide insurance to consumers when the producer price is vo...
Authorities often lack information for efficient regulation of the commons. This paper derives a cri...
In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermedi...
Marginal cost pricing, so often praised in theoretical as well as empirical studies, is correct only...
It is usually argued that the monopolistic pricing distortion arises because "a monopoly can raise i...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
In this thesis an attempt is made to describe the main features and some of the attendant problems o...
We study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention for a risky v...
In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters....