A joint modelling of objective worlds and subjective perceptions within two-dimensional semantics eliminates the margin for error principle and solves the epistemic sorites paradox. Two objective knowledge modalities can be defined in two-dimensional frames accounting for subjective perceptions: "necessary knowledge" (NK) and "possible knowledge" (PK), the latter being better suited to the interpretation of knowledge utterances. Two-dimensional semantics can in some cases be reduced to one-dimensional ones, by defining accessibility relations between objective worlds that reflect subjective perceptions: NK and PK are respectively equivalent to □□ and ◊□ in some one-dimensional frame, and to □ and another modality in some other
Item does not contain fulltextThis paper draws a bird's eye view of various counter-intuitive charac...
Version of March 05, 2007. An extended abstract of the paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 2006...
We compare three strategies to model the notion of vague knowl-edge in epistemic logic. Williamson’s...
A joint modelling of objective worlds and subjective perceptions within two-dimensional semantics el...
Forthcoming in Synthese.In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson formulates an argument ...
We discuss two interpretations of two-dimensional semantics (2DMS) due to D. Chalmers and R. Stalnak...
According to the epistemic theory of vagueness defended in particular by Sorensen (2001) and William...
The author describes two uncontrolled assumptions in cognitive semantics that researchers have barel...
ABSTRACT The paper focuses on the model of situation concept – a representation that constitutes th...
In this article we are aiming to build cognitive semantics over a first person perspective. Our goal...
The interpreted system model offers a computationally grounded model, in terms of the states of comp...
Copyright © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.The underlying question is h...
Cognition is both empowered and limited by representations. The matrix lens model explicates tasks t...
This paper discusses the role of consciousness in the distinctions between reception and perception,...
I focus on the distinction between sensation and perception. Perceptions contain additional informat...
Item does not contain fulltextThis paper draws a bird's eye view of various counter-intuitive charac...
Version of March 05, 2007. An extended abstract of the paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 2006...
We compare three strategies to model the notion of vague knowl-edge in epistemic logic. Williamson’s...
A joint modelling of objective worlds and subjective perceptions within two-dimensional semantics el...
Forthcoming in Synthese.In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson formulates an argument ...
We discuss two interpretations of two-dimensional semantics (2DMS) due to D. Chalmers and R. Stalnak...
According to the epistemic theory of vagueness defended in particular by Sorensen (2001) and William...
The author describes two uncontrolled assumptions in cognitive semantics that researchers have barel...
ABSTRACT The paper focuses on the model of situation concept – a representation that constitutes th...
In this article we are aiming to build cognitive semantics over a first person perspective. Our goal...
The interpreted system model offers a computationally grounded model, in terms of the states of comp...
Copyright © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.The underlying question is h...
Cognition is both empowered and limited by representations. The matrix lens model explicates tasks t...
This paper discusses the role of consciousness in the distinctions between reception and perception,...
I focus on the distinction between sensation and perception. Perceptions contain additional informat...
Item does not contain fulltextThis paper draws a bird's eye view of various counter-intuitive charac...
Version of March 05, 2007. An extended abstract of the paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 2006...
We compare three strategies to model the notion of vague knowl-edge in epistemic logic. Williamson’s...