We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies
This paper investigates implementation of social choice functions in the complete information enviro...
This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to re-ductions in the str...
This paper reconsiders implementation of social choice functions defined as mapping from states to c...
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily...
We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an ar...
We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map from states to lotteries and may d...
We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map states to lotteries, where agents ...
I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal d...
I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal d...
This paper investigates the implementation problem of a social choice function in the complete infor...
We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete ch...
We investigate implementation in the complete information environments, where a social choice functi...
This paper introduces a new concept for full implementation that takes into account agents'preferenc...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of "partially honest" individuals....
We investigate implementation of social choice functions where the central planner has no knowledge ...
This paper investigates implementation of social choice functions in the complete information enviro...
This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to re-ductions in the str...
This paper reconsiders implementation of social choice functions defined as mapping from states to c...
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily...
We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an ar...
We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map from states to lotteries and may d...
We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map states to lotteries, where agents ...
I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal d...
I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal d...
This paper investigates the implementation problem of a social choice function in the complete infor...
We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete ch...
We investigate implementation in the complete information environments, where a social choice functi...
This paper introduces a new concept for full implementation that takes into account agents'preferenc...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of "partially honest" individuals....
We investigate implementation of social choice functions where the central planner has no knowledge ...
This paper investigates implementation of social choice functions in the complete information enviro...
This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to re-ductions in the str...
This paper reconsiders implementation of social choice functions defined as mapping from states to c...
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