Guarding the Guardians of the Regulatory State: Understanding the Role of Judicial Accountability in the Governance of Regulatory Agencies

This doctoral dissertation contributes to the debate on the accountability of the regulatory state by studying the role of judicial controls in the governance of regulatory agencies. The investigation consists of three individual research projects motivated by an overarching research question, which enquires how does judicial review of administrative decisions shapes the democratic accountability of the regulatory state. The research conducted here bridges frameworks and research methods from political science and administrative law to better understand how different governments have addressed the need for judicial controls to supervise regulatory agencies. The empirical evidence used for this research consists of unique information compiled by the author in three original and comprehensive datasets, which allowed to conduct diverse research methods for the examination of the evidence. The theoretical frameworks adapted for this study are designed to contribute with empirical knowledge about the varieties of judicial accountability adopted globally to supervise regulation authorities of two of the most representative industries operating under the ‘independent agency’ oversight governance paradigm: the energy and telecommunications public utilities, which are also supervised by competition regulators. The analysis starts with a global perspective of judicial accountability provisions implemented around the globe to supervise regulatory agencies. I conducted a comparative assessment of the intensity of judicial review that courts of appeal can exercise to supervise the legality of regulatory decisions of 100 authorities. The second investigation performs a closer examination of judicial supervision over regulatory agencies from two countries representative of opposite legal traditions: Spain and the United Kingdom. Finally, a third study enquires about the causes that prevent young regulatory agencies to comply with lawful administrative procedures throughout the enforcement of regulation. This last investigation studies the case of the Mexican Agency for Safety, Energy and Environment (ASEA). The overall outcomes of this study advance our understanding of the challenges to improve democratic mechanisms to hold regulatory agencies accountable, which is not only fundamental for a successful performance of regulatory institutions, but also a necessary condition to legitimize the activity of the state, enhance the trust on our governments and the consolidation of democratic values