LISSAT Analysis of a Generic Centrifuge Enrichment Plant." Paper presented at

ABSTRACT The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems for current and future plants in the nuclear power fuel cycle. The DOE is engaging several DOE National Laboratories in efforts applied to safeguards for chemical conversion plants and gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants. As part of the development, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed an integrated safeguards system analysis tool (LISSAT). This tool provides modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, generation of diversion paths, and evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios, including material extraction and concealment measures, are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Statistical analysis evaluates the effectiveness of measurement verification plans and randomly timed inspections. Time domain simulations analyze significant scenarios, especially those involving alternate time ordering of events or issues of timeliness. Such simulations can provide additional information to the fault tree analysis and can help identify the range of normal operations and, by extension, identify additional plant operational signatures of diversions. LISSAT analyses can be used to compare the diversion-detection probabilities for individual safeguards technologies and to inform overall strategy implementations for present and future plants. Additionally, LISSAT can be the basis for a rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis of safeguards and design options. This paper will describe the results of a LISSAT analysis of a generic centifuge enrichment plant. The paper will describe the diversion scenarios analyzed and the effectiveness of various safeguards systems alternatives