Warrant is unique

Abstract Warrant is what fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. But a problem arises. Is there just one condition that satisfies this description? Suppose there isn't: can anything interesting be said about warrant after all? Call this the uniqueness problem. In this paper, I solve the problem. I examine one plausible argument that there is no one condition filling the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I then motivate and formulate revisions of the standard analysis of warrant. Given these revisions, I argue that there is, after all, exactly one warrant condition. Keywords Warrant Á Huemer Á Merricks Á Plantinga Á Knowledge Á Epistemology Background Distinguish two ways of characterizing a condition C. The first (functional analysis) tries to state the role C plays in the relevant (epistemic, moral, etc.) economy. Functional analyses pick out a condition (or conditions) by description; one can imagine a functional analyst saying, 'let C name that condition (or those conditions) that satisfy the following description...'. A second way of characterizing a condition C (substantive analysis) tries to state what C actually is (or at least, when it holds). A substantive analysis is an attempt to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions of C's being realized. Put differently, whil