Dare to Fail: Nuclear Superiority, Threat Initiation, and Compellent Success

Are nuclear weapons effective tools of coercion? This question has become the subject of renewed academic debate with some scholars arguing that nuclear superior states are more likely to achieve their goals in crises and others claiming that nuclear weapons have no discernable effect on compellent threats. This article synthesizes these competing strands of scholarship by examining how the nuclear balance of power affects the initiation, conduct, and outcome of compellent threats. We argue that nuclear superior states are more likely to achieve compellent success because they are more willing to run the inherent risks involved in international coercion. Using data from the Militarized Compellent Threat Dataset, we show that states in a position of nuclear superiority are more likely to: issue compellent threats, show resolve in compellent settings, and ultimately achieve compellent success. This article demonstrates that nuclear superior states enjoy more coercive success because they are more willing to try