Philosophical Foundations for the Concept of Information: Selective and Structural Information

Abstract. The most fundamental question in the philosophy of information "What is information?" has not received yet a definite answer free from commonly recognized deficiencies. In my earlier work I have proposed a definition of information as an identification of the variety. The definition is based on the concept of the one-many relation, a philosophical theme as old as philosophy itself. The rich tradition of the theme established through the centuries of philosophical discourse is in a clear contrast to the common sense concepts such as "uncertainty" usually utilized in attempts to set foundations for the concept of information. An identification of the variety can have two basic forms of a selection of one out many in the variety, or of the structure uniting the variety (many) into one. The distinction of the forms of identification leads to the distinction between the selective and structural information. However, since every occurrence of one type of information is always accompanied by the other, selective and structural information can be considered just different manifestations of the uniform concept of information. The selective information can be easily identified with the concept of information in its usual understanding. The structural manifestation of information has been considered usually in the context of integration of information. In the present paper the analysis of the concept of information based on the one-many relation is being carried out in the three perspectives. First, the philosophical aspects of information are considered. Then, the concept of information is being identified in a selection of very different domains. For instance, Hutcheson's concept of beauty dominating classical aesthetics since 18 th century, understood as "unity in variety," provides an example of an idea very close to structural information. Integration of the neuronal activity in the brain considered as a basis for consciousness by Edelman and his collaborators can be also viewed as an example of structural information in a different domain. Finally, an attempt is being made to identify a mathematical formalism which reflects the distinction of the selective and structural information. ©2005 by MDPI (http://www.mdpi.org). Reproduction for non commercial purposes permitted. 2 Introduction In this article I am revisiting my earlier proposal of an answer to the question "What is information?" in the conceptual framework of the one-many relation In spite of the frequent occurrence of the word "information" in a large variety of contexts, there is no commonly accepted answer to the question about its meaning. Even worse, there is no agreement whether it is possible to provide a uniform answer independent from the context in which the word "information" is used. The views are scattered between the two extreme positions, between the belief that there are as many meanings of the word "information" as domains of its application, and the view that different contexts differentiate only manifestations of the uniform entity which can and should be clearly and properly defined. While I belong to supporters of the latter position, I cannot accept any of the numerous former attempts to define the meaning of this uniform concept of information. In particular, I cannot accept the two most popular formulations of the definition of information as a "resolution, reduction of uncertainty" I have provided several critical arguments against the earlier attempts to define information elsewhere One of the most common errors in the attempts to grasp the meaning of information was an extrapolation of the conceptual and analytic framework of the study of communication (carried within the "conduit metaphor of information&quot