Abstract Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem JEL classification: C72; D71; D82
Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study...
The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embed-ded into mechanism theory...
When environments are 'rich', single-valued social choice functions which are implementabl...
Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and ...
The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) b...
The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) b...
Any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto power with at least three part...
The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of t...
Nash implementation, Social choice correspondence, Elementary mechanism, Economic environment, C72, ...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
Benoît and Ok (2008) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social c...
I consider the implementation problem under complete information and employ Nash equilibrium as a so...
Benoît and ok (games econ behav 64:51–67, 2008) show that in a society with at least three agents an...
In exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, we find that: (1) several solutions satisfy Th...
Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study...
The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embed-ded into mechanism theory...
When environments are 'rich', single-valued social choice functions which are implementabl...
Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and ...
The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) b...
The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) b...
Any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto power with at least three part...
The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of t...
Nash implementation, Social choice correspondence, Elementary mechanism, Economic environment, C72, ...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
Benoît and Ok (2008) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social c...
I consider the implementation problem under complete information and employ Nash equilibrium as a so...
Benoît and ok (games econ behav 64:51–67, 2008) show that in a society with at least three agents an...
In exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, we find that: (1) several solutions satisfy Th...
Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study...
The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embed-ded into mechanism theory...
When environments are 'rich', single-valued social choice functions which are implementabl...