Justice and authority (within and) beyond the state:the mutual-dependence account and its implications

Our lives are increasingly governed by decisions taken beyond the state— examples include ICJ verdicts, WTO rules, and EU regulations. But under what conditions are these decisions authoritative? And how do these conditions relate to substantive criteria of justice? To answer this question, I discuss three families of accounts of legitimate authority: purely procedural, purely instrumental, and mutualdependence accounts. Purely procedural accounts take justice and authority to be altogether separate. Purely instrumental accounts make attributions of authority entirely dependent on institutions’ efficacy in realizing justice. Mutual-dependence accounts see justice and authority as mutually defining each other. On these accounts, an institution has authority if and only if it does what it reasonably can to omnilaterally interpret and secure the demands of justice. I argue that mutualdependence accounts are superior to their rivals, and conclude by sketching their implications for the authority of the ICJ and the WTO