Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from political life. The central claim of this work is that far from standing apart from the political realm, judicial independence is a product of it. It is defined and protected through interactions between judges and politicians. In short, judicial independence is a political achievement. This is the main conclusion of a three-year research project on the major changes introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and the consequences for judicial independence and accountability. The authors interviewed over 150 judges, politicians, civil servants and practitioners to understand the day-to-day processes of negotiation and interaction between poli...
Roger Masterman examines the dividing lines between the powers of the judicial branch of government ...
In this article, the author argues that the concept of judicial independence has served more as an...
In this article we test to what extent Kelsenian‐type constitutional judges are independent from pol...
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from politi...
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from politi...
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from politi...
Judicial independence is increasingly under threat. The rise of populism risks undermining the separ...
Judicial independence is increasingly under threat. The rise of populism risks undermining the separ...
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do cit...
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do cit...
article published in law reviewI begin with a question: why have a conference on judicial independen...
'Principles of judicial and quasi-judicial independence are fundamental to all democracies and yet, ...
Judicial independence is critical to enforcement of separation of powers, effective protection of pr...
Judicial independence is critical to enforcement of separation of powers, effective protection of pr...
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do cit...
Roger Masterman examines the dividing lines between the powers of the judicial branch of government ...
In this article, the author argues that the concept of judicial independence has served more as an...
In this article we test to what extent Kelsenian‐type constitutional judges are independent from pol...
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from politi...
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from politi...
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from politi...
Judicial independence is increasingly under threat. The rise of populism risks undermining the separ...
Judicial independence is increasingly under threat. The rise of populism risks undermining the separ...
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do cit...
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do cit...
article published in law reviewI begin with a question: why have a conference on judicial independen...
'Principles of judicial and quasi-judicial independence are fundamental to all democracies and yet, ...
Judicial independence is critical to enforcement of separation of powers, effective protection of pr...
Judicial independence is critical to enforcement of separation of powers, effective protection of pr...
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do cit...
Roger Masterman examines the dividing lines between the powers of the judicial branch of government ...
In this article, the author argues that the concept of judicial independence has served more as an...
In this article we test to what extent Kelsenian‐type constitutional judges are independent from pol...