We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We characterize equilibrium and conditions for identification, and derive comparative statics
This is a chapter in preparation for the Handbook of Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandr...
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferab...
Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on sear...
Abstract. We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable u...
We investigate a matching game with transferable utility when some of the characteristics of the pla...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
We review recent advances in the estimation of matching models under transferable utility, with spec...
In October 2012 the Nobel prize was attributed to Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley for their work on matchi...
Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and util-ities nontransferable. We ...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earl...
A model of the labor market under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneou...
This is a chapter in preparation for the Handbook of Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandr...
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferab...
Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on sear...
Abstract. We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable u...
We investigate a matching game with transferable utility when some of the characteristics of the pla...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
We review recent advances in the estimation of matching models under transferable utility, with spec...
In October 2012 the Nobel prize was attributed to Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley for their work on matchi...
Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and util-ities nontransferable. We ...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earl...
A model of the labor market under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneou...
This is a chapter in preparation for the Handbook of Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandr...
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferab...
Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on sear...