In this paper we present a dynamic discrete-time model that allows to investigate the impact of risk-aversion in an oligopoly characterized by a homogeneous non-storable good, sticky prices and uncertainty. Our model nests the classical dynamic oligopoly model with sticky prices by Fershtman and Kamien (Fershtman and Kamien, 1987), which can be viewed as the continuous-time limit of our model with no uncertainty and no risk-aversion. Focusing on the continuous-time limit of the infinite horizon formulation we show that the optimal production strategy and the consequent equilibrium price are, respectively, directly and inversely related to the degrees of uncertainty and risk-aversion. However, the effect of uncertainty and risk-aversion cruc...
This paper considers dynamic pricing strategies in a durable good monopoly model with uncertain comm...
This paper analyzes the impact of risk and ambiguity aversion - Knightian uncertainty - on the choic...
We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goo...
We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where goods are differentiated and prices are sticky. We stu...
We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where goods are differentiated and prices are sticky. We stu...
AbstractThis paper considers Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation when the firms have in...
We study the stability of cartels in a differential game model of oligopoly with sticky prices (Fers...
This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing t...
We study the stability of cartels in a di¤erential game model of oligopoly with sticky prices (Fersh...
This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the cl...
We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments. We show that the subgame perfect equ...
In this paper, we consider interaction between spot and forward trading under demand and cost uncert...
The authors model an oligopoly facing uncertain demand where each firm chooses as its strategy a "su...
This paper provides a theory of intertemporal pricing in a small market with differential informatio...
We construct dynamic Bertrand-Stackelberg pricing models including two manufacturers and a common re...
This paper considers dynamic pricing strategies in a durable good monopoly model with uncertain comm...
This paper analyzes the impact of risk and ambiguity aversion - Knightian uncertainty - on the choic...
We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goo...
We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where goods are differentiated and prices are sticky. We stu...
We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where goods are differentiated and prices are sticky. We stu...
AbstractThis paper considers Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation when the firms have in...
We study the stability of cartels in a differential game model of oligopoly with sticky prices (Fers...
This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing t...
We study the stability of cartels in a di¤erential game model of oligopoly with sticky prices (Fersh...
This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the cl...
We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments. We show that the subgame perfect equ...
In this paper, we consider interaction between spot and forward trading under demand and cost uncert...
The authors model an oligopoly facing uncertain demand where each firm chooses as its strategy a "su...
This paper provides a theory of intertemporal pricing in a small market with differential informatio...
We construct dynamic Bertrand-Stackelberg pricing models including two manufacturers and a common re...
This paper considers dynamic pricing strategies in a durable good monopoly model with uncertain comm...
This paper analyzes the impact of risk and ambiguity aversion - Knightian uncertainty - on the choic...
We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goo...