Production contracts can be used to reduce or transfer risk but at a cost to the producer. The degree of risk transfer and its implicit cost can be determined using a Bayesian framework. The value of additional information is hypothesized as a function of the structure of the comn1odity market
This paper examines the choice of contract length for workers who possess unique skills. Uncertainty...
I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for gener...
We consider a principal-agent relationship where a buyer contracts with a risk-averse supplier for t...
A risk-averse buyer and seller contract over the trade of an item. At the time of trading, they each...
4 pp., 1 tableAbout one-third of the total value of U.S. agricultural production is produced under c...
In environments of uncertainty risk sharing is often an important element of economic contracts. We ...
The major mechanisms for the transference of price and output risk by crop producers are examined. T...
Two means by which commodity producers can reduce their exposure to quantity risk are share contract...
This paper has two goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production ...
In the contract for sale in practice the most important issues are related to transfer of risk and a...
This paper presents a principal-agent model in which subsequent to contracting the risk averse agent...
For production risk with identified physical causes, the nature of risk, production characteristics,...
For production risk with identified physical causes, the nature of risk, pro-duction characteristics...
The pricing of items of construction work using Component Unit Pricing (CUP) Theory requires that co...
The paper aims to understand buyer-supplier power and dependence scenarios following a risk sharing ...
This paper examines the choice of contract length for workers who possess unique skills. Uncertainty...
I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for gener...
We consider a principal-agent relationship where a buyer contracts with a risk-averse supplier for t...
A risk-averse buyer and seller contract over the trade of an item. At the time of trading, they each...
4 pp., 1 tableAbout one-third of the total value of U.S. agricultural production is produced under c...
In environments of uncertainty risk sharing is often an important element of economic contracts. We ...
The major mechanisms for the transference of price and output risk by crop producers are examined. T...
Two means by which commodity producers can reduce their exposure to quantity risk are share contract...
This paper has two goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production ...
In the contract for sale in practice the most important issues are related to transfer of risk and a...
This paper presents a principal-agent model in which subsequent to contracting the risk averse agent...
For production risk with identified physical causes, the nature of risk, production characteristics,...
For production risk with identified physical causes, the nature of risk, pro-duction characteristics...
The pricing of items of construction work using Component Unit Pricing (CUP) Theory requires that co...
The paper aims to understand buyer-supplier power and dependence scenarios following a risk sharing ...
This paper examines the choice of contract length for workers who possess unique skills. Uncertainty...
I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for gener...
We consider a principal-agent relationship where a buyer contracts with a risk-averse supplier for t...
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