Is tenure Security Pro-poor? Decomposing Welfare Effects

We examine the impact of land tenure security on household welfare among poor house- holds in rural Ethiopia. Using the 2005 land title certification program as a quasi- experiment, we exploit the variation in the differential timing of certification between treated and control groups. Estimated results from binary and continuous treatment effect models point out that land tenure security significantly improves the welfare of poor households in rural Ethiopia. This effect varies depending on the length of house- hold's treatment duration. Households who have longer treatment duration receive a higher average welfare gain from the program. We also decompose the welfare effects of the program into different channels. Hired labor is the main mediator through which land title certification affects household welfare. Acknowledgement : I gratefully acknowledge Henrik Hansen, Finn Tarp, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de Janvry, John Rand, Edward Samuel Jones, Yonas Alem, Benedikte Bjerge, Alexandra Orsola-Vidal, Kuranda Morgan, Daley Kutzman, for their invaluable comments on earlier versions; participants of the work in progress seminar at the University of California Berkeley, University of California Santa Cruz, University of Gothenburg, University of Copenhagen, Development Economics Research Group (DERG) at the University of Copenhagen, World Bank 2016 Land and Poverty Conference, the Nordic Conference in Development Economics in Copenhagen, Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) conference at Oxford University for helpful suggestions and comments