This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms in developing countries. First, we demonstrate that economic reforms that are proceeding successfully may run into a political impasse, with the reform’s initial success having a negative impact on its political sustainability. Second, we demonstrate that greater state capacity to make compensatory transfers to those adversely affected by reform, need not always help the political sustainability of reform, but can also hinder it. Finally, we argue that in ethnically divided societies, economic reform may be completed not despite ethnic conflict, but because of it
This paper presents a public choice model that consists of a special interest group that benefits fr...
Using a novel data set from post-communist countries in the 1990s, this paper examines linkages betw...
This paper presents a model portraying a country in a political deadlock about reform proposals that...
This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms ...
This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms ...
Why do entrenched interests so often oppose economic reform? This phenomenon is especially vexing be...
Why do economic reforms that are proceeding successfully often run aground? In this paper we show th...
This paper analyzes the political economy of the reform process theoretically and empirically.Buildi...
The article presents a theoretical model of political conflict and democratic stability in a small o...
Which political and institutional factors trigger reforms that enable the poor to benefit from the p...
Why do economic reforms that are proceeding successfully often run aground? A number of observers ha...
This chapter analyses reform over time across countries and sectors. Four scenarios for reforms are ...
In late-century Africa, domestic reformers and the international community prescribed political refo...
Social structure and economic development largely influence the nature of social conflicts and polit...
This paper has two purposes. The first of these is to offer a quite comprehensive review of the poli...
This paper presents a public choice model that consists of a special interest group that benefits fr...
Using a novel data set from post-communist countries in the 1990s, this paper examines linkages betw...
This paper presents a model portraying a country in a political deadlock about reform proposals that...
This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms ...
This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms ...
Why do entrenched interests so often oppose economic reform? This phenomenon is especially vexing be...
Why do economic reforms that are proceeding successfully often run aground? In this paper we show th...
This paper analyzes the political economy of the reform process theoretically and empirically.Buildi...
The article presents a theoretical model of political conflict and democratic stability in a small o...
Which political and institutional factors trigger reforms that enable the poor to benefit from the p...
Why do economic reforms that are proceeding successfully often run aground? A number of observers ha...
This chapter analyses reform over time across countries and sectors. Four scenarios for reforms are ...
In late-century Africa, domestic reformers and the international community prescribed political refo...
Social structure and economic development largely influence the nature of social conflicts and polit...
This paper has two purposes. The first of these is to offer a quite comprehensive review of the poli...
This paper presents a public choice model that consists of a special interest group that benefits fr...
Using a novel data set from post-communist countries in the 1990s, this paper examines linkages betw...
This paper presents a model portraying a country in a political deadlock about reform proposals that...