Sovereign debt is not sustainable even in the presence of uninsurable risks; which extends the result of Bulow and Rogoff (1989). But the argument is not as general. Indeed, examples show that positive borrowing may be enforced even though the sovereign’s natural debt limits, corresponding to the most pessimistic evaluation of future endowment, are finite. Unsustainable sovereign debt in incomplete asset markets requires a strong version of high implied interest rates: the value of the most optimistic evaluation of future endowment is finit
The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a r...
We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent ser...
Recent experience taught us that advanced economies can be subject to debt crises, with tremendous i...
We show that sovereign debt is unsustainable if debt contracts are not supported by direct sanctions...
We quantify gains from introducing limited financing through non-defaultable debt into a model of eq...
The paper aims at improving our understanding of self-enforcing debt in competitive dynamic economie...
International audienceThe paper aims at improving our understanding of self-enforcing debt in compet...
Bulow and Rogoff (Am Econ Rev 79(1):43–50, 1989) show that lending to small countries cannot be supp...
Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could b...
International audienceWe develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not imp...
We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for rep...
In this paper we review the literature on sovereign debt with particular emphasis on indexation and ...
We analyse the poisonous interaction between bank rescues, financial fragility and sovereign debt di...
How domestic costs of default do interact with the threat of exclusion from credit markets to determ...
This paper develops a model of sovereign debt where governments are myopic. Instead of focusing on t...
The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a r...
We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent ser...
Recent experience taught us that advanced economies can be subject to debt crises, with tremendous i...
We show that sovereign debt is unsustainable if debt contracts are not supported by direct sanctions...
We quantify gains from introducing limited financing through non-defaultable debt into a model of eq...
The paper aims at improving our understanding of self-enforcing debt in competitive dynamic economie...
International audienceThe paper aims at improving our understanding of self-enforcing debt in compet...
Bulow and Rogoff (Am Econ Rev 79(1):43–50, 1989) show that lending to small countries cannot be supp...
Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could b...
International audienceWe develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not imp...
We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for rep...
In this paper we review the literature on sovereign debt with particular emphasis on indexation and ...
We analyse the poisonous interaction between bank rescues, financial fragility and sovereign debt di...
How domestic costs of default do interact with the threat of exclusion from credit markets to determ...
This paper develops a model of sovereign debt where governments are myopic. Instead of focusing on t...
The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a r...
We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent ser...
Recent experience taught us that advanced economies can be subject to debt crises, with tremendous i...