Add to ORKGWe report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics or they just vote sincerely
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...