By targeting enforcement efforts on specific segments of the regulated community, greater compliance with environmental regulations can be achieved. In this paper, the inspection minimizing targeting scheme with two groups is derived. Firms are moved at random into the target group, while escape from the target group occurs only when an inspection reveals the firm is in compliance. The optimal targeting scheme reduces inspection costs compared with the strategy suggested by Harrington (1988), where firms are moved into the target group on the basis of compliance record. However, the range of parameter values for which the optimal solution is feasible is limited
We derive a set of optimal environmental regulations in the presence of asymmetric information about...
Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should the head of an enforcement...
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of op...
By targeting enforcement efforts on specific segments of the regulated community, greater compliance...
By targeting enforcement efforts on specific segments of the regulated community, greater compliance...
In this paper I model the optimal monitoring and enforcement strategy when inspection capacity is fi...
We expand the optimal targeting enforcement literature to allow regulator inspection capacity constr...
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and t...
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and t...
This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the strategic interactions between en...
Across countries and regions, we observe wide variations in the level of enforcement instruments (fi...
We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between ...
Targeting is the practice of inspecting firms most likely to violate a regulation. This paper provid...
Abstract. This paper proposes a modeling framework for the design of optimal environmental charges, ...
In practice, targeted monitoring seems to be a strategy frequently used by regulators. In this paper...
We derive a set of optimal environmental regulations in the presence of asymmetric information about...
Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should the head of an enforcement...
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of op...
By targeting enforcement efforts on specific segments of the regulated community, greater compliance...
By targeting enforcement efforts on specific segments of the regulated community, greater compliance...
In this paper I model the optimal monitoring and enforcement strategy when inspection capacity is fi...
We expand the optimal targeting enforcement literature to allow regulator inspection capacity constr...
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and t...
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and t...
This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the strategic interactions between en...
Across countries and regions, we observe wide variations in the level of enforcement instruments (fi...
We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between ...
Targeting is the practice of inspecting firms most likely to violate a regulation. This paper provid...
Abstract. This paper proposes a modeling framework for the design of optimal environmental charges, ...
In practice, targeted monitoring seems to be a strategy frequently used by regulators. In this paper...
We derive a set of optimal environmental regulations in the presence of asymmetric information about...
Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should the head of an enforcement...
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of op...