The notion of distortion was introduced by Procaccia and Rosenschein (2006) to quantify the inefficiency of using only ordinal information when trying to maximize the social welfare. Since then, this research area has flourished and bounds on the distortion have been obtained for a wide variety of fundamental scenarios. However, the vast majority of the existing literature is focused on the case where nothing is known beyond the ordinal preferences of the agents over the alternatives. In this paper, we take a more expressive approach, and consider mechanisms that are allowed to further ask a few cardinal queries in order to gain partial access to the underlying values that the agents have for the alternatives. With this extra power, we desi...
By taking sets of utility functions as a primitive description of agents, we define an ordering over ...
We study Matching, Clustering, and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agen...
We develop a finite random assignment model where players know either their cardinal or their ordina...
The notion of distortion was introduced by Procaccia and Rosenschein (2006) to quantify the ineffici...
Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study o...
In most social choice settings, the participating agents are typically required to express their pre...
We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
A voting mechanism is a method for preference aggregation that takes as input preferences over alter...
We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, whe...
Social choice theory is concerned with aggregating the preferences of agents into a single outcome. ...
We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization unde...
In many situations, a group of individuals (called agents) must collectively decide on one of severa...
We study the Maximum Weighted Matching problem in a partial information setting where the agents' ut...
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matchin...
By taking sets of utility functions as a primitive description of agents, we define an ordering over ...
We study Matching, Clustering, and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agen...
We develop a finite random assignment model where players know either their cardinal or their ordina...
The notion of distortion was introduced by Procaccia and Rosenschein (2006) to quantify the ineffici...
Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study o...
In most social choice settings, the participating agents are typically required to express their pre...
We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
A voting mechanism is a method for preference aggregation that takes as input preferences over alter...
We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, whe...
Social choice theory is concerned with aggregating the preferences of agents into a single outcome. ...
We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization unde...
In many situations, a group of individuals (called agents) must collectively decide on one of severa...
We study the Maximum Weighted Matching problem in a partial information setting where the agents' ut...
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matchin...
By taking sets of utility functions as a primitive description of agents, we define an ordering over ...
We study Matching, Clustering, and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agen...
We develop a finite random assignment model where players know either their cardinal or their ordina...