Equality and power : Spinoza's reformulation of the Aristotelian tradition of egalitarianism

There is an almost unanimous agreement on Spinoza’s democratic credentials, which is surprising, given, the wildly divergent interpretations on Spinoza’s philosophy. And yet, it is next to impossible to find any discussion of equality in Spinoza’s work. Partly this is due to Spinoza himself, who refers to equality sporadically but never systematically. For instance, Spinoza mentions in Chapters 16 and 17 of the Theological-Political Treatise that both in democracy as the “most natural constitution” and in the “theocracy” of Hebrew state people enjoyed equality, but this does not seem to suggest much more than that in both of these cases the citizens do not transfer their natural right to another human person. This absence of a sustained discussion of equality in Spinoza raises a problematic: Is it possible to defend a theory of democracys without a sense of equality? Or is it perhaps the case that Spinoza never thematizes equality explicitly because it is included within another concept? I will argue that the latter is the case. Spinoza’s sense of equality is inextricably linked to his conception of power and the production of state authority