Science and values: the problem of methodology in the historical school of philosophy of science

Adherents of the historical school of philosophy of science propose a new conception of the aims and task of philosophy of science in comparison with the followers of normative philosophy of science. Investigation of those convictions and images that were accepted in a certain historical period, but not the logical analysis of knowledge becomes the main problem in the historical school of philosophy of science. This approach overturns the old methodological status of philosophy of science. But the new point of view isn't ftawless, either. The main fault of the new position is the presumption that the scientific knowledge functions as an autonomous system irrespective of the philosophical or theological context and the conception that cognitive values only are significant in scientific research. From our point of view, analysis of scientific knowledge without consideration of the metaphysical context is invalid, because science is subordinate to this context. Change of metaphysical-scientific research programmes but not the shift of paradigms or scientific research programmes probably take place in the process of scientific development