Proceedings of The First Symposium on Non-Linear Analysis : CONVEXITY, CHAOS AND FRACTALS / edited by K.Nishizawa. The First Symposium on Non-linear Analysis and its Applications. 25-27 April 1996 The Conference Hall MIZUTA Memorial Library Josai University
We consider socially structured transferable utility games. For every coalition the relative strengt...
We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have eith...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
Proceedings of The First Symposium on Non-Linear Analysis : CONVEXITY, CHAOS AND FRACTALS / edited b...
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core underst...
We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a univ...
In this paper we develop a new model of a cooperative game with a continuum of players. In our model...
URL des Documents de travail : https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr/publications/Documents de tra...
We prove a representation theorem for the core of a non-atomic game of the form v = fOil, where Il i...
We prove a representation theorem for the core of a non-atomic game of the form v = fOil, where Il i...
We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann-...
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games int...
We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable u...
We consider socially structured transferable utility games. For every coalition the relative strengt...
We consider games in characteristic function form where the worth of a group of players depends on t...
We consider socially structured transferable utility games. For every coalition the relative strengt...
We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have eith...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
Proceedings of The First Symposium on Non-Linear Analysis : CONVEXITY, CHAOS AND FRACTALS / edited b...
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core underst...
We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a univ...
In this paper we develop a new model of a cooperative game with a continuum of players. In our model...
URL des Documents de travail : https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr/publications/Documents de tra...
We prove a representation theorem for the core of a non-atomic game of the form v = fOil, where Il i...
We prove a representation theorem for the core of a non-atomic game of the form v = fOil, where Il i...
We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann-...
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games int...
We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable u...
We consider socially structured transferable utility games. For every coalition the relative strengt...
We consider games in characteristic function form where the worth of a group of players depends on t...
We consider socially structured transferable utility games. For every coalition the relative strengt...
We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have eith...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
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