Gli accordi interconfederali mancanti

The paper describes the various reasons which prevented reaching the agreement on the reform of industrial relations in 2008, and therefore also the subscription of the protocol on income policy and contractual arrangements of July 23, 1993, deemed absolutely necessary for a new launch of Italian economic system. The first part analyses all the preconditions, after Prodi Government subscribed the Protocol of July 23, 2007 on Social Security, Labour and Competitiveness for Sustainable Equity and Growth, which made many believe that the goal though ambitious was still a reachable one. These preconditions were the government favourable approach toward labour unions, an apparent consolidation of the unity of labour unions leading to the subscription of the protocol of July 23, an increased tax revenue endowing the government with the so-called “tesoretto”, extra money which seemed enough to satisfy negotiations. The third part deals with the reasons why that specific agreement was not reached and why the government fell, a government which had appeared too weak - also due to a scarce majority in Parliament - not to be held hostage by labour union veto players since its very establishment. The conclusions analyze the unsolved problems of a slow and farraginous system of industrial relations, as appears the Italian at the end of 2008, with far too many collective contracts, often beyond expiry, and too many strikes in crucial sectors. An inter-union system still lacking a law on union representation, which reforming is largely called upon but that no one manages to change, as it is the hostage of the veto players it made flourish over the years.The paper describes the various reasons which prevented reaching the agreement on the reform of industrial relations in 2008, and therefore also the subscription of the protocol on income policy and contractual arrangements of July 23, 1993, deemed absolutely necessary for a new launch of Italian economic system. The first part analyses all the preconditions, after Prodi Government subscribed the Protocol of July 23, 2007 on Social Security, Labour and Competitiveness for Sustainable Equity and Growth, which made many believe that the goal though ambitious was still a reachable one. These preconditions were the government favourable approach toward labour unions, an apparent consolidation of the unity of labour unions leading to the subscription of the protocol of July 23, an increased tax revenue endowing the government with the so-called “tesoretto”, extra money which seemed enough to satisfy negotiations. The third part deals with the reasons why that specific agreement was not reached and why the government fell, a government which had appeared too weak - also due to a scarce majority in Parliament - not to be held hostage by labour union veto players since its very establishment. The conclusions analyze the unsolved problems of a slow and farraginous system of industrial relations, as appears the Italian at the end of 2008, with far too many collective contracts, often beyond expiry, and too many strikes in crucial sectors. An inter-union system still lacking a law on union representation, which reforming is largely called upon but that no one manages to change, as it is the hostage of the veto players it made flourish over the years.Articles published in or submitted to a Journal without I