Uncertainty and Transparency of Monetary Policy

What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a framework characterized by: a) common uncertainty on potential output, and b) imperfect knowledge of the central bank target (and inference of the true policy reaction function) by the private sector. We show that full transparency is socially beneficial under a variety of parametrizations. Our results confirm, in a different set up, those of Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), and Svensson (2006).What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a framework characterized by: a) common uncertainty on potential output, and b) imperfect knowledge of the central bank target (and inference of the true policy reaction function) by the private sector. We show that full transparency is socially beneficial under a variety of parametrizations. Our results confirm, in a different set up, those of Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), and Svensson (2006).Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc