Is group ontology morally distracting? A natural law approach to corporate religious liberty

In recent years, a variety of corporate litigants, from houses of worship to for-profit enterprises, have brought religious liberty suits to the US Supreme Court. Interestingly, the metaphysical status of such litigants has been subject to intense debate by judges and commentators alike. Are these litigants corporate moral persons or mere aggregates of individuals? How, if at all, does their metaphysical status affect our assignment of corporate rights to religious freedom? While many have entertained such questions, others reject them as morally distracting. This article challenges that latter position. Drawing upon the natural law tradition, I argue that group ontology can be used in the assignment of corporate rights in a morally illuminating way. I point out the tradition’s distinctive ontology, which views groups primarily as social actions, subject to moral evaluation. I then discuss how this conception moves attention away from polarizing rights-based discourse towards measured consideration of what is morally right. Finally, I show how this ontology helps practical reasoning to discover a variety of (non-rights-based) reasons and means to protect religious freedoms as well as other moral stakes. Far from causing moral distraction, a natural law group ontology facilitates careful moral deliberation