‘Reserved ratification’: an analysis of states’ entry of reservations upon ratification of human rights treaties

Governing elites often ratify human rights treaties, even when their policies do not align with those treaties’ obligations. We argue that this can be explained by the fact that executives anticipate the potential challenges these treaties could raise vis-à-vis their domestic policies and enter different types of reservations when they ratify to head them off. The types of reservations they use depend on key characteristics of the executive’s policies and practices, as well as its relationship with the legislative and judicial branches. Different types of challenges can be raised by other domestic actors depending on variation in these key factors. The types of reservations executives use will therefore vary depending on the specific challenges ratification raises for them. Using an original dataset of the reservations states entered on human rights treaties registered with the United Nations and employing an event history analysis, we show that the particular challenges treaties present for executives in different types of states help to explain variation in how they use reservations when they ratify human rights treaties