Exemptions for Religious Groups and the Problem of Internal Dissent

Liberal justifications of exemptions for religious groups appeal to the rights or interests of individuals. Individuals’ interests in freedom of re-ligion and association are said to be served through religious groups being granted a level of autonomy from state control, which includes their enjoying exemptions from certain otherwise applicable laws. All such justifications face a significant problem, however, which is that religious groups invariably contain dissenters, who object to the group’s decisions, policies, or current exercise of an exemption. It is un-clear how these internal dissenters’ interests are served by the group being granted exemptions. This chapter explores, and seeks to resolve, this problem. I show that three standard liberal responses—appealing to the religious groups’ own decision-making procedures, to implied consent, and to exit rights—contain important insights, but do not provide a satisfactory solution. I then argue that liberal political theo-ry nonetheless has the resources to justify exemptions for religious groups in the face of internal dissent, by highlighting the way in which dissenters’ own interest in freedom of religion can be protected and promoted through religious group autonomy. This enables liberal theorists to justify internally contested exemptions for religious groups.