Metaethical revisionism: a response to error theory

Error Theorists claim that there is a defect—an error—in our moral concepts. This error leads to their systematic reference failure, and the untruth of all substantive moral claims. I deny this and propose a Revisionist alternative. If the purported defect is present, then we should revise our moral concepts. Error Theorists claim that this is not possible, as the defect is a "non-negotiable" feature of the concepts. This final claim is, in my view, the most interesting part of their argument, and the focus of the thesis. Revisionist theories have been offered in a number of domains. Such views are sometimes claimed not to advance their respective debates because they succeed only in changing the subject. This objection is correct that revision is not always an option, but there are clearly some cases in which we can revise our concepts. A central task for the thesis is therefore to understand the conditions under which conceptual revision is possible. This means accounting for the phenomenon of conceptual "negotiability". If the view presented here is correct, it should be useful for Revisionists in any domain. Chapter 1 expounds the standard argument for Error Theory, clarifying three premises: Conceptual, Ontological, and Non-Negotiable. Conceptual and Ontological are granted for the sake of the argument. Chapter 2 offers my theory of conceptual negotiability. Chapter 3 applies that account, arguing against Non-Negotiable, the claim that moral concepts cannot be revised in the relevant way. Chapter 3 also discusses and defends Metaethical Revisionism as a plausible and appealing theoretical option. Finally, Chapter 4 offers my own (somewhat speculative) account of what is truly non-negotiable for moral concepts and considers some candidate metaethical revisions. The Conclusion presents a summary of the argument of the thesis (it might helpfully be read after the Introduction, and before Chapter 1).