All that glitters is not gold: the re-use of securities collateral as a source of systemic risk

Since the 1980s, regulators in the U.S. and the U.K. have protected the collateral taker’s right to re-use securities collateral in securities financing and OTC derivatives markets on the understanding that it would promote liquidity and credit growth, and reduce systemic risk. However, this rationale was incomplete: it failed to acknowledge the full implications of collateral re-use for systemic risk. In this dissertation, I aim to complete that understanding by illustrating how the re-use of securities collateral in those markets can aggravate systemic risk. In particular, I describe two effects. First, re-using securities collateral multiplies the number of market participants that will be exposed to changes in the price of the collateral asset and can thus amplify the role of asset prices as channels of contagion. Second, by conferring a right to re-use, the collateral provider will effectively waive its proprietary interests in the collateral assets and retain a mere contractual claim against the collateral taker for the return of equivalent securities. This transformation will accentuate the incentive of the collateral provider to run from an over-collateralised collateral taker if the latter were to experience financial difficulty. Information asymmetries and a lack of coordination among collateral providers could push the collateral taker over the brink of insolvency. These risks pose an obvious question for regulators: what should we do about collateral re-use? At a time when international bodies are drawing their attention to this widespread market practice, the question is an invitation to a very timely reflection. The final chapter of the dissertation offers an answer to this question and assesses the potential efficacy of the most recent regulatory initiatives in relation to collateral re-use.