Law, poverty and time: the dynamics of poverty in constitutional human rights adjudication

Poverty is an event in time. Only dynamic thinking can fully capture its reality. This thesis contends that human rights case law is based on a static perception of poverty inconsistent with the dynamic perception of poverty in economics. Failing to notice its temporal aspects, the examined courts consequently produce judgments that overlook essential aspects of this socio-economic phenomenon. This is puzzling, since in other contexts of constitutional human rights adjudication the passage of time bears a significant role. This means that for courts to switch from a static perspective to a dynamic perspective of poverty does not require new legal tools. The duration of poverty and change in poverty can be incorporated into judicial thinking using familiar norms and doctrines. The extent of poverty, whether it is transitory or a long-term situation, the chances of escaping it in the near future, the fluctuations in depth of poverty over the years, the probability that upon emerging from poverty one will be caught up in it again, the inheritance of poverty from parents to children: these are all time-related concerns that bear profound significance on the lives of poor people. A static examination not only overlooks these issues, but also neglects the essence of long-term poverty. Viewing poverty through the lens of time would reveal a broader and more complex human rights picture, producing a richer legal analysis, and, finally, leading to a more suitable remedy. This study examines cases that consider claims relating to the economic situation of poor people, concentrating on examples from France, Canada and Israel. The analysis reveals the temporal approach of each judgment and suggests an alternative, dynamic reading of poverty.