Sentences, statements, statutes

The question of how one should interpret a statute turns at least in part on the question of what a statute is. This article considers how the enactment of a statute changes the law and how philosophy of language and the social ontology of legislating inform our understanding of statutes and their interpretation. The article contrasts the ideas of statute as sentence, statute as statement, and statute as choice. I argue that statutes are not mere sentences on which a function is performed. They are in a sense statements, but statements that cannot be properly understood without thinking carefully about the nature of the language user (the legislature) and the reasons for which it acts. That is, statutes are not only statements but are also reasoned choices, a truth that informs how one interprets them and how they change the law. In explaining the nature of statutes and statutory interpretation, one should follow the reasons for legislating. This is a course of reflection in which the social ontology of legislating and the philosophy of language have a vital role to play